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Abstract
This paper provides an exposition of the nature, means of estimation and uses of
Financial Conditions Indexes (FCIs) and their relationship to the more common
Monetary Conditions Indexes (MCIs) that are used by market analysts,
international organisations and central banks. Using panel datasets for Western
Europe we explore how asset prices, particularly house and stock prices, can
provide useful additional indicators of future changes in output and inflation. We
find a clear role for house prices but a poorly determined relationship for stock
prices. Unfortunately the most useful role for FCIs comes from their incorporation
of high frequency data and the opportunity this gives for extracting information
about changes in market expectations for inflation and output. This helps market
participants make judgements about likely central bank reactions and helps central
banks assess the stance of policy between forecasts. While stock prices are high
frequency, house prices are not. At quarterly frequency central banks in particular
will want to use traditional economic forecasting methods and summary indicators
like FCIs will have only a limited role. We illustrate how such an FCI can be
used, drawing on monthly data for Finland.
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Rahoitusmarkkinoiden tilaa kuvaavat indeksit
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David Mayes – Matti Virén
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa esitellään rahoitusmarkkinoiden tilaa kuvaavien indeksien
(Financial Conditions Indexes, FCI) luonnetta, estimointia ja käyttöä sekä näiden
indeksien suhdetta yleisemmin käytettyjen rahamarkkinoiden tilaa kuvaaviin
indekseihin (Monetary Conditions Indexes, MCI). Näitä indeksejä k äyttävät
analyytikot, kansainväliset organisaatiot ja keskuspankit. Läntisen Euroopan
maista kerättyä paneelidataa käyttäen selvitämme, missä määrin varallisuushinnat,
erityisesti asuntojen ja osakkeiden hinnat, voivat olla hyödyllisiä tuotannon kas-
vun ja inflaation lisäindikaattoreita. Tutkimuksesta ilmenee, että asuntojen hin-
noilla on tässä suhteessa selkeä merkitys, mutta osakkeiden hintojen yhteys näihin
muuttujiin on heikko. Hyödyllisintä FCI-indeksien käyttö on kuitenkin silloin,
kun se perustuu usein julkistettavien tilastoaineistojen hyväksikäyttöön ja sen
mahdollistamaan markkinoiden ennusteiden määrittämiseen. Se taas auttaa mark-
kinaosapuolia päättelemään, mitkä ovat keskuspankin todennäköiset reaktiot. Kes-
kuspankkia se auttaa arvioimaan politiikan tilaa ennustekierrosten välillä. Osak-
keiden hinnoista on saatavissa tiuhaan havaintoja, mutta asuntojen hinnoista ei.
Neljännesvuositasolla erityisesti keskuspankit haluavat käyttää traditionaalisia
ennustemenetelmiä ja siten rahoitusmarkkinoiden tilan indikaattoreilla on vain
vähän käyttöä. Osoitamme tässä työssä, miten tällaisessa tapauksessa FCI-indek-
siä voidaan käyttää tukeutuen Suomea koskevaan kuukausiaineistoon.
Asiasanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden tila, varallisuushinnat, asuntojen hinnat, osakkei-
den hinnat
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Financial markets have for many years used various indicators that seek to show
in summary form the pressure that monetary policy is bearing on the economy.
These indicators normally combine at least four readily available financial prices:
a short (3 month) interest rate, a representative bond rate (10 years), the exchange
rate and a stock price index. They are normally referred to as Financial Conditions
Indexes (FCIs).
1 The logic behind these indexes is that they summarise the
immediate impact of the central bank’s policy instruments on financial prices,
which in turn can be related to future output and inflation through the usual
channels of the transmission mechanism.
2 These financial prices are important not
just because they reflect wealth, which enters into key consumption and
investment relationships, but because they incorporate market expectations of
future price and output developments. Furthermore, unlike indicators primarily
based on economic data, FCIs are continuously updated as financial markets
trade.
Central banks themselves and international organisation such as the IMF,
OECD and European Commission use Monetary Conditions Indexes (MCIs),
which combine either the first three prices or just the short interest rate and the
exchange rate (Mayes and Virén, 2000b). Stock and other asset prices are
normally excluded either because the transmission channel is relatively unclear or
because in practice it is difficult to observe the direct effect.
3 However, central
banks pay considerable attention to stock market prices in their own right, as
maintaining financial stability as well as price stability is part of their objective.
4
Stock price bubbles and their collapse can have serious problems for the
economy, which policy might head off (King, 1994; Cechetti et al., 2000). As
reflected in Alan Greenspan’s famous remarks on ‘irrational exuberance’, the
problem is to try to decide how much of such asset price changes seems to be
justified.
5 An FCI offers a means of weighting the information.
In this paper we demonstrate, using an extensive database for west European
countries, that this scepticism over the merits of including stock prices is well
founded. The effects on output and inflation are small and the relationships poorly
determined. However, an FCI can be constructed for these countries using data on
house prices that contains considerably more information than in the equivalent
MCI. Not only can we derive a plausible transmission channel through house
prices but many articles have suggested that it is important not just for private
financial institutions but also for central banks in setting monetary policy to bear
                                                
1 The FCI at some time t, FCIt = Σ iwi(pit – p i0), where p is the financial price, i = 1,2, ..., n
representing each of the n prices, interest rates, the exchange rate etc. that are included, w is the
weight assigned to each price. Period 0 is the base period on which the index is computed. These
indexes are typically normalised to 1, 100 or 1,000 in the base period.
2 Given this impact on future inflation some authors have argued that MCIs are best viewed as
indicators of future inflation rather than of monetary policy (see Grande (1997) for a clear
discussion).
3 Roger (1993).
4 Cechetti et al. (2000) advocate reacting to asset prices as a normal part of maintaining price
stability and in Bryan et al. (2001) suggest how asset prices might be combined with other prices
into an appropriate target. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) are much more cautious.
5 The original remark was made in a speech in December 1996 and repeated in the semi-annual
testimony to Congress the following February.8
house prices in mind.
6 Unfortunately, while an FCI containing stock prices
remains an indicator based on high frequency data, which can be updated
continuously during trading hours, an FCI including house prices can only be
updated periodically as most countries only have house price data on a quarterly
or at best monthly basis.
7 However, given that international organisations and
others taking a longer-term view normally only publish financial indicators at
annual or at most quarterly frequency this is not a drawback.
We therefore derive FCIs using stock and house prices for EU countries in the
ensuing sections and consider their merits. As there is no obvious explanation in
the literature, Section 2 defines FCIs and explains how they can be compiled.
Section 3 goes on to suggest how they can be used. This sets the context for our
own estimation of the components of FCIs for the members of the European
Economic Area (EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) in Section 4. After
appraising the results we go on to construct an explicit FCI and consider its
implications in Section 5.
2 Deriving FCIs
The key feature of the FCI (or MCI for that matter) is that it is a measure that
draws on continuously updated financial market variables and is hence available
on  ‘real time’ basis for financial market participants. It will therefore employ
‘benchmark’ prices that are readily available in the market. The main value of the
indicator is that it in turn is thought to be related to future values of economic
activity or inflation. Thus it provides continuously updated information about the
future, whereas traditional economic forecasts are only updated monthly or
quarterly (or half yearly in the case of the published Eurosystem forecast).
Goldman Sachs provide a good illustration of how FCIs are compiled and
used in practice. For a number of countries they use (in real terms) short rates (3
month), long rates (10 year government bond), and the trade weighted exchange
rate for an MCI, adding the market capitalisation to GDP ratio (or a real all-share
market index) to create an FCI.
8 With minor variations this is the normal list of
financial variables, asset prices, included in an FCI. In the case of South Africa
(Goldman Sachs, 2001) made a reason for calculating the indexes explicit ‘We
develop monetary and financial conditions indices for South Africa to reassess the
bank’s likely [monetary policy] response in the year ahead.’ (The South African
Reserve Bank refers to ‘monetary conditions’ in its 	
	.)
                                                
6 See Cecchetti et al. (2000) for a helpful survey. Previously house price information was both
sparse and rather non-comparable but recent work by Iacoviello (2000) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2000) shows that newly available data enables us to build FCIs for the euro area. The
European Mortgage Federation and the ECB are compiling up to date series so that current FCIs
containing house prices could be maintained.
7 It might in theory be possible to get high frequency data relating to the housing market if there
are sufficient highly traded property companies in equity markets to form a representative
subindex. However, this does not apply in general to our sample of countries and the poor
experience with the overall stock market index may not bode well for the use of subindexes either.
8 While it is rare to compute the weights behind FCIs or MCIs using nominal data, as this conflicts
with the underlying economic theory, it is normal compute the value of the indexes themselves in
nominal terms in the short run. MCIs and FCIs are measured compared to some arbitrary starting
point. As deflators are measured for discrete intervals, either quarters or months, the nominal and
real values will be the same inside that interval.9
This particular reason provides quite a complex link between the indicator and
future values of activity and inflation. We can decompose the link into three parts.
First of all, the South African Reserve Bank is a conventional inflation targeter, in
the sense that it sets its monetary policy instruments on the basis of the inflation
that it expects in the future. It therefore uses models both to forecast what it
expects to happen to inflation and to decide how the monetary policy instruments
it has at its command (in effect the interest rate in the overnight money market)
can affect future inflation. If the outlook for inflation at its current instrument
setting is unacceptable in terms of the target then the Reserve Bank will change
the setting until the result forecast is deemed to be acceptable. This does not of
course mean that inflation will always be forecast to be on target, as the Bank may
be unwilling or unable to make changes of sufficient magnitude.
The second part of the link is that the central bank’s instrument affects a set of
proximate financial variables that in turn affect inflation (given the other current
and expected values of other variables that also affect inflation). These proximate
variables are those listed in the FCI. The Bank’s instrument is of course only one
factor influencing the value of those variables. If the FCI does not include some
variables that are an important part of the transmission mechanism of the setting
of the monetary policy instrument through to inflation then the third part of the
link will be weakened.
This final part of the link is that the observer can then infer likely future
moves in monetary policy settings from shifts in the FCI and from shifts in their
expectation of how the Reserve Bank’s forecast will change. There will be a
financial gain for anyone who can guess better than the market as a whole from
this information. To take the simple case where nothing else in the forecast
appears to have changed, then it would be possible to infer that, if there had been
a significant move in the FCI, the Reserve Bank would reset interests rates in
order to bring the FCI back to levels consistent with its inflation objective.
Similarly, if it is thought that the central bank’s forecast or requirements will
change, then it is possible to compute backwards how the policy setting would
have to alter. In practice of course both the expected forecast and the FCI will
change. The FCI will change in response to the expectations of the market as a
whole over both the future and the central bank’s likely moves. Since central
banks do not respond in a mechanistic manner, however much they believe their
own forecasts and models, the inferences drawn through this complex link can
easily be rather inaccurate.
9
As Grande (1997) points out, these indicators are providing information about
two things: – inflation and monetary policy. It depends on the user’s objectives as
to which of these objectives applies in any particular circumstance. As in any
signal extraction problem in order to isolate the relevant information it is
necessary not just to be clear about the objective but also to establish what other
assumptions or conditions need to apply.
                                                
9 As has been widely pointed out (Gerlach and Smets (1997); Jacobsen et al. (1998), for example)
the impact of a shock on the MCI (and on the value of the MCI that the central bank thinks is
appropriate for maintaining price stability) will depend on the source of the shock as well as its
size. Hence in second-guessing the central bank market players have to make a judgement over
what the bank will have decided with respect to both of these aspects, thus adding to the potential
inaccuracy of their decision.10
Instead of taking this argument further at this point, we go on first in this
section to explain how FCIs can be derived and defer until section 3 the further
exploration of how FCIs can be used, especially by central banks.
2.1 Determining the variables and their weighting in FCIs
There are two fairly obvious ways of determining the weights (relative
importance) of the component variables in the index or indeed in deciding upon
whether the variables should be included at all. The first, which Goldman and
Sachs use, is to apply the approach explored in Stock and Watson (2000). This
approach is largely atheoretic and simply asks the question of whether asset prices
are leading indicators of real economic activity and inflation and if so how they
can be combined to provide optimal forecasts. It is a prior condition that the
variables included should cointegrate.
10 As Stock and Watson explain ‘the optimal
weights correspond to the theoretical regression coefficients in a regression of the
true future value on the various forecasts’. Hence of course the weights will tend
to vary according to how far ahead one is trying to forecast.
11 Goldman and Sachs
appear to do this directly while Stock and Watson (2000) simply use the median
forecast from the group of indicators.
12 This latter approach of course would not
enable us to construct an FCI, although we could use it to produce ‘real time’
forecasts of output and inflation using the four component asset prices in the
Goldman and Sachs index. In these circumstances one would publish the
continuously updated forecast rather than the indicator. However, this in turn
would have to be combined with the forecasts from other real activity, price, wage
and money stock variables that one would normally include in modelling. The
forecasts from these latter variables would of course only be updated at the
discrete intervals at which new information for them becomes available.
The second and more conventional approach is to try to explain the
mechanism by which the financial variables affect economic activity and inflation
and then model that directly.
Asset prices are normally thought to feature in the transmission mechanism in
three main ways. First of all they may be directly incorporated in the CPI either
immediately or with a short lag. In so far as the CPI tries to cover expenditure
then interest rates may enter through either credit charges or mortgage payments.
On the whole this effect is avoided, explicitly in the case of the definition of the
HICP (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) that is used by the ECB in its
definition of price stability. However, some countries, such as Australia and New
Zealand have had elements of interest rates directly in their CPIs. In both cases
the central banks sought to eliminate these effects from their inflation targets by
following some measure of ‘underlying inflation’ from which more volatile
elements were stripped. (Including interest rates is particularly disastrous for
monetary policy as the target will increase every time the central bank tightens
                                                
10 Bryan et al. (2001) provide a different atheoretic approach in showing how asset prices can
contribute to explaining the trend in inflation, using a ‘dynamic factor index’.
11 Mayes and Virén (2000b) show how these weights can vary according to the time horizon in the
case of an MCI.
12 It is worth noting why Stock and Watson use this rather more robust approach to combining
forecasts. They find that the forecasting performance of various individual indicators is unstable.
Hence although adding asset prices improves forecasts the appropriate weights vary over time.11
monetary policy and would lead to a cycle of tightening, albeit a convergent one,
with similar volatility in the downwards direction as inflation falls.)
The most common direct effect is from the exchange rate, as a large range of
import prices will be affected by the exchange rate when prices are next reset in
the domestic currency, mainly over the next 3 to 6 months. However, this pass
through into the CPI is variable, partly according to the economic cycle (Baxter,
1994) and partly according to the perceived permanence of the exchange rate
change. There is normally no direct stock market price effect on the CPI and it is
rare for house prices to be directly included, although surveyors, real estate agents
and others involved in transaction often make their fees proportionate to house
prices. The price of building materials, paints, fittings etc. will also be affected by
surges in the supply of houses (through DIY merchants) and that also tends to
follow house prices but with a lag.
The second effect on the CPI comes indirectly through the impact on wealth
and incomes. Wealth features directly in most consumption functions, so a
proportion of rises in asset prices (falls in interest rates) will be translated into
increases in spending. That increase in demand will in turn affect inflation,
increasing it sharply as demand exceeds sustainable supply. Here the lags are
longer and the main impact tends to come through one to two years ahead,
although there is often substantial persistence.
Lastly asset prices may have an effect through the credit channel, affecting the
ability of firms to raise capital to finance investment.
13 However, asset prices have
a characteristic that is useful in the current context, namely that they incorporate
an element of expectations. Thus they not only act as a leading indicator of future
consumer prices because of the transmission mechanism but they enable us to
work out what people expect to happen to inflation in the future. Inflation
expectations can be backed out of the yield curve (Söderlind and Svensson, 1997).
Since asset prices take account of the stream of future earnings during their
lifetime, they will respond increase in expected productivity or other growth rates.
Thus they have an important information value about the future both through the
transmission mechanism and through what they reveal about what people
expect.
14
Goodhart (2001) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) provide a clear
exposition of a straightforward means of representing the transmission mechanism
and in doing so also give an eloquent explanation of why central banks should be
concerned with asset prices when targeting inflation. They argue that it is possible
to set up a simple IS or aggregate demand curve that explains the output gap in
terms of the variables in the FCI (although they do not phrase it that way).
15 They
do not include the 10-year bond rate from Goldman and Sachs (2001) list but they
add real house prices.
16 This gives the real three month interest rate, the real
exchange rate, stock prices and house prices as the four arguments in the function
(both current and four quarter lagged values). The link to inflation is then
                                                
13 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a clear exposition.
14 We do not consider addressing the problem through quantities rather than prices. How far one
can go in using money, credit and other aggregates is widely debated, as Meltzer (1995), inter alia,
explains.
15 The form of the IS curve they employ is very similar to that used in Mayes and Virén (1998) and
again here.
16 Much of the literature concerned with house prices (Mayes, 1979; Iacoviello, 2000, for example)
is concerned with what explains house prices, rather than their role in explaining subsequent
inflation.12
provided by an aggregate supply function in the form of a Phillips curve, where
the determinants are lagged inflation and the output gap.
17
The addition of house prices is crucial to the argument here and the dropping
of the 10-year rate of only limited consequence as Mayes and Virén (2000b) show
for most of the EU countries. House prices represent a variable that appears to
form a part of the transmission mechanism that is not accounted for by the other
variables. Including stock prices helps take account of some aspects of the credit
channel and aspects of company sector wealth not accounted for by interest rates.
House prices do the same for the household sector. For most households their
house is their main asset, although this effect will be weakened in countries where
renting is prevalent.
18 Although there is a clear link between interest rates and
house prices and of course the impact of interest rates on households’ cash flow
dominated by mortgage payments
19 not all of the impact appears to be accounted
for by the interest rate effect.
20
This approach to establishing an FCI appears promising. Goodhart and
Hoffman (2000) demonstrate for a set of 17 OECD countries over the period
1973–1998 (with some missing data in four cases) that in all countries except Italy
changes in house prices have a clear effect on the output gap. In turn they are able
to show a clear feedthrough from the output gap to inflation. Although it might be
more appropriate to allow for nonlinearity and asymmetry in the Phillips curve
(Mayes and Virén, 2000a) the relationship is robust.
21
Stock prices on the other hand have a significant effect in only 8 out of the 17
countries. What is rather more surprising is that real interest rates only show
significant coefficients in 9 cases and real exchange rates in 6. Only in the cases
of Spain, the Netherlands and the UK can all four determinants be clearly
separately identified. This illustrates a clear difficulty in building up FCIs from
this information, as the determination of the weights would be fragile. The
experience in developing MCIs successfully for an overlapping set of countries in
Mayes and Viren (1998) suggests two problems. First that the relationship is not
necessarily constant across different monetary policy regimes and second that the
channels of influence of the four variables are interrelated. As Eika et al. (1997)
point out, these sorts of IS curves present a wide range of problems for estimation,
which require the resulting estimates to be treated with considerable caution.
                                                
17 Gernberg (2001) inter alia demonstrates how the addition of the exchange rate can improve the
operation of simple policy rules for central banks.
18 As Maclennan et al. (1999) Table 1 shows there is considerable variation across the 11 European
countries in our sample. Owner-occupation is the main form of tenure in all countries except
Germany, where private renting and owner-occupation formed roughly equal proportions, the
remaining quarter of tenure being ‘social’ renting. Owner-occupation only covers about half of
dwellings in the Netherlands (most of the remainder being social renting) and co-operative
ownership is common in Sweden. The percentages shown in Chuiri and Japelli (2000) (Table 6)
based on survey data are similar but show a rather different profile across countries according to
the age of the head of household.
19 Outstanding residential mortgage debt amounted to over 50% of GDP in Denmark, Germany,
Netherlands, the UK and Sweden according to Maclennan et al. (1999) using European Mortgage
Federation data.
20 The impact of this on perceived inflation dynamics will be particularly important for central
banks like the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, whose models do not include house prices as such
and measure wealth more generally (Black et al., 1997).
21 Goodhart and Hofmann set out their two equations as the aggregate demand and supply curves
in a structural model but as Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) point out this model could also be
regarded as a restricted VAR.13
The point of the Goodhart and Goodhart and Hofmann papers is somewhat
different from our own. Although also concerned with the implications for
monetary policy, the first conclusion is that it is appropriate to include asset prices
in the target for monetary policy. While they do not extend this to stock prices,
they explicitly argue for the inclusion of house prices in the CPI. This is a subject
of hot debate among central banks and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1997)
went to a great deal of effort to persuade Statistics New Zealand to exclude house
prices from the CPI. (New Zealand was one of the few countries to include new
house prices directly, rather than some measure of housing costs.) Less
controversially, Goodhart and Hofmann go on to conclude that central banks
would be well advised to pay more attention to current asset prices in deciding
how to set monetary policy to control future inflation (a point well established in
Cechetti et al. (2000) for example).
22
The success of the Goodhart and Hofmann work helps confirm our own
decision to continue to follow this second approach in extending our work on
MCIs in Section 4. Using this form of economic model, rather than just
concentrating on optimising the forecasting properties behind the FCI, not only
helps clarify the reasoning behind choosing particular variables but also leads to a
much more direct link with the ways in which some central banks set monetary
policy, with the benefit of particular economic models.
23 Where forecasts from
many models are combined either explicitly or implicitly as in the case of the
Bank of England or the Eurosystem then the Stock and Watson route might be a
better representation. It is certainly important to bear in mind their findings of
instability when applying our approach.
24 However before moving on to the
empirical results, we motivate the paper by exploring how FCIs can be used in
practice, particularly by central banks.
                                                
22 Here the debate is over whether one should seek to include asset prices in the target for
monetary policy or in the ‘rule’ used for setting monetary policy (Genberg, 2001). As Svensson
(2001) makes clear, target rules are to be preferred to instrument rules from a technical point of
view, implying that asset prices should be in the target. However, the credibility of the target often
depends on its simplicity to the general public and hence modification of the CPI by the central
bank is usually unattractive. In such a case one either has to follow Goodhart (2001) and get the
official statisticians to amend the CPI to include asset prices or use asset prices as information
variables in the setting of policy with a typical unamended CPI. FCIs can form part of this second
route.
23 Among others, the Bank of Finland, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the
South African Reserve Bank and the Norges Bank are obvious examples.
24 There are other well known routes for trying to incorporate the information, such as the VAR
approach used by Iacoviello (2000) for six European countries. While his model is largely closed,
using real income, inflation, real house prices, a nominal short-term interest rate and real money
balances, it would be possible to extend it by including the exchange rate. Mayes and Virén (1998)
explore a four variable VAR for the euro area and Jacobsen et al. (1998) a more extended exercise
for Sweden. Neither, however, incorporates house prices. While a VAR/VECM representation
may make it rather difficult to back out the appropriate weights for an FCI it does illustrate very
clearly the differences in the ways different shocks to the economy affect both the components of
an FCI and output and inflation.14
3 Using FCIs in practice
In the previous section we explained how financial analysts use FCIs to try to
second guess how central banks are going to set monetary policy. It is one thing
for an outside institution to use indicators to try to estimate what is going on
behind closed doors. (We argue elsewhere (Mayes, 1999; Tarkka and Mayes,
1999) that central banks should seek to be as transparent as possible, so as to
minimise the costs to the economy from the private sector’s errors in forecasting
their behaviour.) It is quite another for the central bank itself to use such
indicators when it has full access to the information that lies behind monetary
policy decision-making.
In the main the usefulness of the FCI comes as an indicator using high
frequency data in the period between forecasts but in a slightly more direct
manner than for outside observers. Although the line of argument is clearest when
forecasts are based on a single model or related group of models the reasoning
applies to any updating process involving economic data. When the forecast is
formed it will generate a base value for the FCI, which is consistent with the
expected future and the current setting of policy. (It will also generate a future
path for the FCI if the forecasting method allows variation in interest and
exchange rates. In which case the consistent value of the FCI can vary for each
discrete time period in the forecast.)
25 In the period before the next issue of
economic data, when it will be possible to rerun the forecast properly, the central
bank can observe how the components of the FCI and hence the FCI itself change.
The FCI value will be an amalgam of information. On the one hand, in the
absence of any shocks or ‘news’ it will tell us how much financial conditions are
changing. Such changes will just represent ‘noise’ in the system and will have no
consequences for policy or the real economy. If there is a shock to economic
prospects the FCI will also change. This change will give an indication of what
the markets see as the impact of the change, including their guess as to the likely
reaction by the central bank. Their guess as to the central bank’s reaction should
be observable from the yield curve, so it should be possible to separate out the
components (see Valckx (2001) for an exposition).
The problem for the central bank in observing what appears to be a shock
from the movement of the FCI is to decide first of all what the shock is and
secondly to judge whether the market’s guess as to what the implications are for
monetary policy is correct. When the movement of the FCI is sufficient to have a
potential implication for policy then the central bank will react, either validating
the shift implied by the yield curve or making clear what its (different) view
actually is. Of course, the central bank might observe a shock and decide that this
had implications for the setting of monetary policy even when the FCI did not
shift, because the market did not regard the shocks as newsworthy. It is thus
possible to get two pieces of information from the FCI, first on expectations and
                                                
25 In Tarkka and Mayes (1999) we argue strongly for central banks (and other organisations for
that matter) to produce forecasts that include the likely evolution of policy. If they do not they will
be inconsistent with many of the inputs to the forecast, which are based on all the information
available and not conditional on fixed interest or exchange rates – the conventional assumption.
Having inconsistent forecasts will make it difficult to extract information from any indicator, such
as an FCI, that is not conditioned in the same way.15
second on the likely impact on inflation or the output gap from this source alone.
Both of these help in the formulation of policy.
Shifts in the FCI without any identifiable cause or to an extent different from
that estimated as appropriate by the central bank can be regarded as ‘portfolio
shocks’ ie changes in the preferences of wealth holders. Large portfolio shocks
will have an implication for policy.
It is essential not to get into the trap of assuming that all FCI movements
imply the need for a shift in policy settings. In the case of the MCI, both the Bank
of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand found (Freedman, 1995, for
example) that the markets tended to take the implication of shocks rather
mechanistically. They assumed for example that if the exchange rate rose, thereby
increasing the MCI, then the central bank would want to see the interest rate fall
to keep the MCI and hence the effect on inflation roughly constant. This of course
would not be true if the exchange rate shift were itself a response to a shock. The
central bank under those circumstances might want to see a change in financial
conditions to offset the impact of the shock. If the FCI moves by what the central
bank thinks is the appropriate amount then no policy reaction will be forthcoming.
The market has already made the necessary adjustment. As a result, while the
quotation of MCIs was designed to reduce the need for central bank intervention
and to stabilise markets, it may have done the reverse (Svensson, 2001).
26
The New Zealand and Canadian experience should thus make central banks
careful in the way in which they refer to any FCIs or to financial conditions when
describing the needs for policy. The Bank of Canada (Freedman, 1995) made it
clear that the MCI was not some sort of intermediate target. There was only one
target and that was inflation. The MCI (and hence any FCI) merely gives an
indication of how monetary (financial) conditions are changing, from which all
parties then have to draw inferences. The phraseology can be a little confusing, as
Bank of Canada (1995) refers to ‘using the MCI as an operational target of
policy’. They define an operational target as ‘a variable that the central bank can
influence fairly directly when it changes the setting of its instrument variable’.
However, this use was explicitly in the context of their macroeconomic model
(Longworth and Poloz, 1995) and formed part of the quarterly forecasting
process. The staff forecast for the Policy Board of the Bank included a track for
the MCI over the coming few quarters that was consistent with achieving the
Bank’s inflation objective.
The RBNZ was even more cautious in introducing the concept of an MCI, as
it had had the benefit of observing the markets ‘over’-reaction in Canada. It
appears from the arguments based on Goldman Sachs’s FCIs, for example, that
this lesson has been learnt. The FCI is a yardstick against which to judge central
banks’ likely non-mechanistic responses to changes in economic prospects.
FCIs, as we have described them, do not really play a useful role with respect
to house prices. We establish in the next section that house prices appear to have
an important role to play in the transmission mechanism and that we can estimate
plausible weights for their inclusion in an FCI. However, as they are not
continuously measured we would need to use them differently.
From the point of view of international organisations like the European
Commission, IMF and OECD who use MCIs only to show the longer term
                                                
26 This experience in finding that an attempt to clarify and simplify a complex issue can mislead
runs counter to the simple trade-off put forward in Winkler (2000) as a reason for wanting to limit
the ‘transparency’ of central banks.16
evolution of the balance of monetary and fiscal measures in the pressure from
macroeconomic factors the lower frequency presents no problem. The question at
lower frequency is then why one should prefer an FCI to other measures. The
principal reason that these organisations find is simply that it enables them to
provide a summary in a single statistic of a number of different factors. It
simplifies the discussion of monetary policy and the challenges it faces somewhat.
This is thus to quite some extent a matter of external communication. It is quite a
different question to ask what the central bank, or indeed other organisations,
should do for their internal purposes where simplicity may not be at such a
premium.
From the point of view of the central bank, it is an interesting question where
in the sequence of decision-making the information on asset prices should be
included. Presumably the ideal in the current framework is that the central bank’s
model should incorporate all of the transmission channels through to future
inflation adequately, including current asset prices. They will then be
appropriately weighted with all the other determinants and the dynamic structure.
If current asset prices are incorporated in the target then the problem changes.
First of all they tend to be more volatile so the target will itself tend to be more
volatile. Current asset prices include information about current and future
consumption prices. Using that information should help control future inflation
not just in consumption prices but in the asset prices themselves. There is a major
literature (Cechetti et al., 2000) about the extent to which central banks should
seek to control asset prices because they have a tendency to overshoot (generate
bubbles). The bursting of these price bubbles can then lead to sharp financial
cycles and consequent disruption to the financial system. The central bank’s duty
to maintain financial stability as well as price stability can therefore be addressed
simultaneously by including asset prices in the target.
How to deal with asset prices remains a contentious issue. What the
discussion of the modelling approach to estimating the weights for an FCI does is
offer a means of deciding upon the relative importance of the different sorts of
asset price information. Whether one needs to go on and estimate the FCI itself
for this context is less clear. We move on therefore to the first step of estimating
the weights.
4 Estimating the weights for an FCI from
european data
As we have surveyed above previous analysis has had difficulty in handling the
whole range of asset prices in a single set of equations because of the different
periodicity of the data. Stock, bond, money and exchange rate market data are
available at high frequency and there is little difficulty in estimating models that
use large numbers of data points. The problem comes in the economic variables to
which they relate. In many countries inflation information is available monthly, as
are data on some real variables. However, full models in a national accounting
framework are at best quarterly so the higher frequency is not really such an
advantage. Lower frequency then suffers from the problem of the short time
period over which it is available. Monetary policy regimes have changed
markedly over recent years, particularly in Europe. If we want to get estimates17
that are relevant for the current euro area it is unlikely that data that predate the
successful period of exchange rate targeting under the EMS will present a
consistent picture. Mayes and Virén (1998) show that there are clear structural
breaks and that IS and Phillips curves estimated across the two regimes tend to
have poor explanatory properties.
We have therefore sought to add to the available information by looking
instead at panel data for 11 European Economic Area countries over the period
1985 to 2000.
27 This of course substitutes one problem for another. Although it
dramatically increases the amount of data we can use to estimate each equation
without going outside a single regime it relies on the validity of hypotheses about
similarities in behaviour of the different countries in the same time period. Earlier
work in Mayes and Virén (2000a) suggests that this restriction can be accepted for
a number of macro-economic relationships, including an extended version of the
IS curve in Mayes and Virén (1998) that we discussed in section 2 above.
We therefore estimate an IS curve that has all the main asset prices of
immediate interest (short-run interest rate, exchange rate, stock market price
index, house prices) embedded in it. In effect this merely adds stock prices and
house prices to the IS curve estimated in Mayes and Virén (2000b).




 = (log) output (GDP at constant market prices) gap,  	
(log) output gap
rr = real interest rate (ie nominal 3 month rate minus annual inflation in the
consumer price index, pc, %)
re = real exchange rate vis à vis US dollar (ie 100*log[e/(pc/pcusa)])
hp = log of house prices deflated by the consumer price index
sp = log of stock prices deflated by the consumer price index.
The estimates obtained for a sample of 11 members of the European Economic
Area for the period 1985Q1 to 2000Q3 are set out in the first two columns of
Table 1. The definitions of the data are given in the Appendix. The 11 countries
are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, UK. Their choice partly reflects the ability to derive usable data
for the common period but given that it covers over 90% of the EEA any element
of adverse selection should be small.
However, not only is this data period rather short but it has been necessary to
use approximated data from the BIS for house prices for 6 countries. Proper direct
estimates of house prices were only available from official sources for the UK and
the Nordic countries. We have, therefore, thanks to the kind help from the author,
used a second data set from Iacoviello (2000) of house prices for five countries:
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK, covering the much longer time period
1972–1999. The results are shown in columns 3 to 6 of Table 1. The Iacoviello
data are derived from some specific private sector sources: in Germany from the
Aufina Residental price index; in Italy from the price index of magazine 
	; in Spain from the Ministerio de Economia y hacienda
                                                
27 Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and Iacoviello (2000) show results for individual European
countries but do not combine the data.18
Residental Price index; in Sweden from the Central Statistical Office House Price
Index and in the UK from the Nationwide Anglia house price index.
In this case, while the data run across monetary policy regimes, they are for a
rather longer period than has been possible in much previous work and hence give
us some idea of how the relationship evolves over the economic cycle. This sub-
group of countries also appears to have sufficient similarities to permit pooling of
the data.
Finally, as noted above, the house price data are only usually available at most
quarterly in the EEA countries. Since an FCI is most useful if computed
continuously we show in the final column of Table 1 the results from using
monthly data for Finland for which we also have monthly GDP estimates. Since
most of the EEA countries do not have similar monthly data either on house prices
or on the real sector it has not been possible to explore pooled estimates here. In
any case it is likely that the short-run dynamics will vary across countries making
pooling a more difficult hypothesis to sustain.
4.1 The nature of the results
It is clear from Table 1 that if one estimates this extended version of the IS curve
for either the full sample of 11 countries or the extended data sample for the 5
countries the results are in general both consistent with earlier findings;
systematically similar in terms of the additional variables and reasonably robust in
terms of estimators and sample periods. The real interest rate and the real
exchange rate (vis à vis the US dollar) enter the equation with reasonably sized
and precise coefficients. The performance of these variables is quite the same for
output gaps (labelled GAP in the Table) and log differences of output (the former
being constructed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter). House prices are always
significant and the coefficient is much larger than that for stock prices.
As is clear from Table 2 for the 11 country model and Table 3 for the 5
country extended data period estimates, adding the housing and stock market
terms has a substantial effect on the relative importance of the real interest rate
and real exchange rate in the regression. Column 1 in both tables shows λ , the
ratio of the interest rate to the exchange rate coefficient. (λ  is the key feature in
MCIs showing the relative importance of the exchange rate in the transmission
mechanism. In relatively closed economies like the United States or Japan the
exchange rate is relatively unimportant, with values of λ  around 8 or 10. In the
EEA on the other hand values in the range 3 or 5 are more common and Mayes
and Viren (1998) estimate that a value of the order of 3.5 could be applied to the
euro area countries as a whole, using the US dollar exchange rate.) λ  falls
markedly in most cases when house prices and stock prices are added to the
regression, as a result of a fall in the importance of the interest rate term.
Shortening the data period (Table 2) for the 11 countries has little impact on
the house price coefficient and when the Iacoviello data are estimated for the
same data period the coefficients are also similar (Table 3). Stock prices on the
other hand show weak coefficients in all specifications, estimation methods and
samples. While one might want to experiment further with the few cases of
appropriate sign and magnitude of the coefficients, the existence of the wrongly
signed and insignificant coefficients counsels caution. It is clear from other19
studies (Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and Goldman and Sachs (2001) for
example) that it is possible to obtain satisfactory estimates for stock prices but that
the weight in the subsequent FCI would be small, typically 10 percent or less.
All in all, one could conclude that house prices could perhaps be included in
the FCI formula to take into account the effects of monetary policy more fully.
Empirical evidence does strongly support the notion that (housing) wealth tends to
boost output growth.
28 Technically, house prices will lower the weight of the real
interest rate variable but the weights could still be considered to be rather
reasonable. By contrast, stock prices perform so poorly that including them in the
index would create considerable conceptual and measurement problems.
All these estimates need to be treated with care. One problem in backing the
weights for the FCI out of an IS curve is that this ignores the channels of
monetary policy through to inflation not captured by the arguments in the curve.
Put another way round. A simple Phillips curve as used by Goodhart and
Hofmann (2000) only accounts for between half and three quarters of the variation
inflation in their sample of 17 OECD countries. Given that in turn estimates of the
output gap from the IS curve only account for two thirds to three quarters of the
variation, there are clear limitations to the inferences that can be drawn.
5 Applying an FCI in practice
If we look at the case of Finland in a little more detail we can see from Fig. 1 that
house prices and stock markets seem to move in a fairly similar manner, which
may help explain why it is difficult to find clearly separate influences in the IS
curve. It is, however, important to note that the scale for stock prices is three times
that of house prices, showing how much more volatile the stock market has been
over the period (largely as a result of the movements in technology stocks,
principally Nokia).
It is arguable that in looking for financial indicators one should look for those
that are more sensitive to external forces. The Finnish housing market as a whole
reflects the tension in the Finnish economy with strong growth in some parts of
the country and decline in the rural areas. Eastern Finland for example is one of
the unemployment blackspots for the EU as a whole. If we take the Helsinki area
on its own, Fig. 2, then we can see an even closer match with the stock market
figures. There is also a clear discrepancy in the years 1986–1990. This coincides
with the generation and realisation of the financial crisis. Stock prices did not
participate in the domestic bubble, aided by the international reverse in October
1987. Thus in this period house prices are a rather better indicator of the overall
financial pressures on the economy than stock prices. For the last decade or so the
relationship between the two series has become close. Thus, it may well be that
the choice of the particular wealth price for the FCI is not so important in terms of
the computation of FCI weights.
The question whether to use house prices or stock prices is not trivial. From
the practical point stock prices are, of course, superior. They are available in real
                                                
28 Why then has this effect not been taken into account in previous studies? Probably largely
because of data reasons; high-frequency house price data do not seem to exist for major European
countries. Currently the ECB is starting to gather these data which may allow their use in
constructing the proper index.20
time – in the same way as other input variables in the MCI. The problem with
stock prices is, of course, how to measure the prices. Which stock exchanges and
individual stocks should be taken into account?
29 How should the stocks of large
multinational companies be treated? Although there are measurement problems
with house prices too, the problems are more practical than conceptual. House
prices have a clear connection to the country of origin. Thus, an index for EU
wide house price developments still makes sense while it is not all clear that an
EU wide stock price index has a similar interpretation. Stock markets across the
world are much more integrated as investment in stocks can flow relatively freely
across borders. Many of those holding shares on the Finnish stock exchange will
not be Finns (70% according to Fig. 3) so the translation between Finnish stock
prices and Finnish wealth in stocks will be indirect. By the same token it is likely
that Finnish wealtholders will be accessing foreign markets direct and that a
portion of their wealth will be reflected in other stockmarket indices. This same
dichotomy will apply at the EU level. Changes in net foreign asset holdings
occurring through capital flows will tend to be picked up by exchange rate
movements in the equation. The switch towards US assets is evident in Fig. 4 for
example.
Given our failure to estimate a satisfactory stock price coefficient for Finland
we illustrate in Fig. 5 what an FCI using house prices would look like and how
this relates to using an MCI or just interest rates. Although the general pattern is
similar, as interest rates have the dominant weight in both the MCI and the FCI, it
is clear that until recent years the addition of the further variables tended to
increase the amplitude of the fluctuation in overall financial conditions. In the
period since the start of Stage 3 of EMU this no longer appears to be the case. The
rise in interest rates after the initial decline in 1999 has been more than offset by
the fall in the exchange rate. However the increase in house prices has in turn
offset some of the exchange rate effect. If we go outside the estimation period
then the discrepancies continue to be of interest. If stock prices had been included
then even with a low weight there would have been a noticeable difference as
Helsinki stock prices trebled between early 1999 and early 2000 before showing
an equally dramatic decline. The swiftness of the change and its reversal seems to
mean that this increase in wealth had little opportunity to be converted into
spending, illustrating the care with which any of these indicators needs to be
interpreted.
FCIs are not necessarily more volatile than MCIs just because they include
stock market indicators. The components are weighted and inclusion of a stock
market index may reduce the weight on other volatile components. Hence making
use of a wider range of asset prices to inform policy may actually be more stable
than just focusing on the more traditional items. Reacting to asset prices may also
be stabilising for the economy but this is a broader concern (Cechetti et al., 2000;
Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000).
                                                
29 Not only are there problems about which index to use to represent a single market (all share
versus top 50 for example) but in some countries there is more than one exchange. As the Neue
Markt indicates these can move in very different patterns.21
6 Concluding remark
The results from using pooled data for most of the European Economic Area to
explore the role of asset prices in explaining the output gap and inflation are
promising. House prices in particular are helpful in providing information in
addition to that contained in interest rates and the exchange rate. It would
therefore seem sensible to include the effect through house prices in any indicator
of the pressures from the monetary side of the economy on future activity and
inflation. We show how a Financial Conditions Index for Finland adds to the
information available from a traditional Monetary Conditions Index. The results
seem robust to differences in data and time period. The effect from stock market
prices is much more difficult to disentangle and their inclusion would tend to be
somewhat speculative and involve rather a low weight.
This finding presents somewhat of a dilemma for the use of Financial
Conditions Indexes. These indexes are at their most valuable in being
continuously updated summaries of market information for the main transmission
channels of monetary and financial variables through to inflation. As such they
show how markets perceive the implications of shocks to the economy not just for
future output and inflation but also for monetary policy. This continuous
monitoring of expectations is also helpful for the central bank in formulating
policy as it has to decide whether these market movements are consistent with the
maintenance of price stability. Most economic data are quarterly or at best
monthly and so economic forecasts can normally only be meaningfully updated at
these longer intervals.
House price data are just such economic data, available only quarterly or
monthly, while stock price data are continuous – at least while markets are open.
Hence adding the house price data to an MCI provides helpful additional
information but not at high frequency. Stock market information is high frequency
but sufficiently noisy that it is not clear that its inclusion would improve the
indicator. We therefore endorse the view of Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and
Cechetti et al. (2000) that useful information for monetary policy can be extracted
from house prices. It would therefore be valuable to compile aggregatable house
price data across EU at relatively high frequency. However, their inclusion in an
FCI would be rather more as a generalised indicator, as MCIs are used by
international organisations such as the IMF, OECD and European Commission
currently. Central banks are likely merely to want to include them as part of the
normal economic modelling, whether they use them as part of the process of price
determination or, more controversially, as part of prices to be stabilised.22
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2 .729 .246 .628 .803 .484 .423 .734
100*see .761 .825 1.002 .621 1.267 0.711 1.234















N/obs 11/540 11/540 5/468 5/240 5/468 5/240 1/171
y(–1) denotes the lagged dependent (output) variable. The two first columns correspond
to the 11 country sample, the subsequent four columns the five country (Iacoviello data)
sample and the last column to Finnish monthly data for 1987M1–2000M3. With the
Finnish data, the foreign output variable is monthly US industrial production. Variables
are as defined in the text although the definition of y depends on whether the output
variable is the output gap or the change in output as indicated by the column headings. N


























































































































The equations also include the lagged dependent variable and the
(lagged) OECD output variable. *) The sample period is 1991Q1–
2000Q3. Otherwise, it is 1985Q1–2000Q3. N denotes the number of
 	
the output gap variables.27
Table 3. 7	..,	1		.
/,


































































































 R indicate the ratio of real interest rate and real exchange rate coefficients.
 R) indicates the (not reported) case in which house and stock prices are
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strictly comparable because of different data samples). Numbers inside

















*) genuine house price data: For other countries, the annual data are BIS data
while quarterly variation is derived from quarterly residental investment prices.



























House prices, whole country, %-annual change























Capital area double room dwelling prices, %-annual change (left scale)
























Market capitalization of all listed shares (left-hand scale)
Market capitalization of non-residents’ holdings (left-hand scale)
Market capitalization of non-residents’ holdings as a percentage of
EUR billion
 total market capitalization (right-hand scale)
Sources: Finnish Central Securities Depository and Helsinki Exchanges.








































87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
RRFIN MCIFIN FCIFIN
Finland
RRFIN= real interest rate (Finland)
MCIFIN = weighted average of the real interest rates and
the real exchange rate (using estimated panel data weights)
FCIFIN = weighted average of rrfin, refin and
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The real interest rate is measured on the left axis, MCI and
FCI on the right axis. Weights are the pooled cross-country
weights. Note that the indexes for MCI and FCI have not
been rescaled – they just represent the impulses of the
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